Existential Perspectives

Existential philosophy/psychology contributes to the understanding of hope through a rigorous definition of what it is (and what it isn't). The French existentialist Gabriel Marcel in Homo Viator: Prolegomenes A Une Metaphysique De L’esperance (Man The Wayfarer: Introduction To A Metaphysics Of Hope) (1944), distinguished hoping from wishing, doubting, certainty, and optimism. Marcel's first point is that it is essential to view hope not as a noun that is possessed, but rather as an active process of being: the verb hoping. In this context, it is possible to describe the phenomenology of hoping and develop the previously mentioned contrasts.

Hoping is seen as distinct from wishing, desiring, or other forms of expectation. The latter usually point to specific desired objects or circumstances, such as a particular Christmas present, a sunny day, a raise in salary. True hoping does not focus on objects; it is concerned with global or existential conditions. The existential theologian Paul Tillich addressed this distinc¬tion in his essay “The Right To Hope” (1965) in The University Of Chicago Magazine, stating that “Hope is easy for the foolish, but hard for the wise. Everybody can lose himself into foolish hope, but genuine hope is something rare and great.”

True hoping is an act of faith within a confrontation with ever-present issues of isolation, freedom, meaning, and death. Marcel in The Esistential Background Of Human Dignity (1963) suggests that wishing is an expression of the ego's desire for satisfaction, while hoping is a state of willing and humble responsiveness to the demands of existence: “But what I realize is that the subject of ‘I hope’ excludes all claims… It is as if hope were situated in another dimension of which it could be said that it is that of humility and patience, a patience which is perhaps a profound and secret characteristic of life… it is the act by which the temptation to despair is actively overcome.” Mere wishing is contrasted with hope by a greater degree of egotistical self-absorption. It is argued that people are often actually declaring a state of wishing when they casually say “I hope that…”

In a similar fashion, Marcel noted that statements of certainty or doubt are frequently couched in an overly self-assertive (or egotistical) tone which tends to discount others' opinions, leading to conflict. Statements of hope reflect a humble acknowledgment of uncertainty, leaving the door open to amicable dialogue. The stance of unwavering optimism is similar to certainty in terms of prideful ego-involvement, and is further distinguished from hope in its degree of distortion of reality. Like a person in a manic episode, the optimist discounts disconfirming evidence and tends to argue that his perspective is superior in utility (“If only others would see things my way”). The hoping person accurately recognizes obstacles, yet maintains a confident belief that there is value in their existence.
When it is argued that true hope requires an accurate appraisal of reality, this discussion points to Pruyser's observation in the essay “Maintaing Hope In Adversity,” in Bulletin Of The Menninger Clinic (1987), that hope only arises when one is aware of the tragic circumstance of life. There is no need for hope in a situation that is already seen as ideal. “In first have some sense of captivity, limitations and sorrows of the human condition, in firsthand experience.” This is exemplified in Viktor Frankl’s previously discussed experience of Nazi concentration camps, as described in his book Man’s Search For Meaning (1959).